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Abstract: User authentication in wireless sensor networks (WSN) is a critical security issue 
due to their unattended and hostile deployment in the field. Since sensor nodes are equipped 
with limited computing power, storage, and communication modules; authenticating remote 
users in such resource-constrained environments is a paramount security concern. Recently, 
M.L. Das proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme in WSNs and claimed that his 
scheme is secure against different kinds of attack. However, in this paper, we show that the 
M.L. Das-scheme has some critical security pitfalls and cannot be recommended for real 
applications. We point out that in his scheme: users cannot change/update their passwords, it 
does not provide mutual authentication between gateway node and sensor node, and is 
vulnerable to gateway node bypassing attack and privileged-insider attack. To overcome the 
inherent security weaknesses of the M.L. Das-scheme, we propose improvements and 
security patches that attempt to fix the susceptibilities of his scheme. The proposed security 
improvements can be incorporated in the M.L. Das-scheme for achieving a more secure and 
robust two-factor user authentication in WSNs. 
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1. Introduction  
With the recent advances in communication technologies, wireless sensor networks (WSN) have 
emerged as a very active research avenue. WSNs have many common features with wireless ad hoc 
networks, and in several cases they are considered as a special case of them [1]. A WSN usually 
consists of a large number of autonomous sensor nodes, which are generally deployed in unattended 
environments. Each sensor node has some level of computing power, limited storage, and a small 
communication module to communicate with the outside world over an ad hoc wireless network [2]. 
WSNs are widely used, including in areas such as military, battlefield, homeland security, healthcare, 
environment monitoring, agriculture and cropping, manufacturing, etc.  
Since the sensor network may operate in a hostile environment such as a military battlefield, 
security is critical. Robust techniques are needed to provide low-latency, survivable, and secure 
networks during the deployment of WSN. In addition, the network should be protected against 
intrusions and spoofing attacks [3]. Access control is an indispensable cryptographic primitive upon 
which other security primitives are built. A WSN should be smart enough to distinguish legitimate 
users from illegitimate users, resulting in the problem of user authentication [3]. If a WSN is deployed 
for a highly secure application, then the data collected within the sensor work is valuable and should 
only be given access to the registered or legitimate users. Benenson et al. first sketched the security 
issues of user authentication in WSN and introduced the notion of n-authentication [4]. Later on, 
Watro et al. proposed a TinyPK authentication protocol with public key cryptography that uses RSA 
and Diffie-Hellman algorithms [5], however, this protocol suffers from masquerade sensor node attack, 
in which an adversary can spoof the user.   
In 2006, Wong et al. [6] proposed a light-weight dynamic user authentication scheme in WSN 
environment. They justified their scheme through security and cost analysis and discussed the 
implementation issues with the recommendations of using the security features of IEEE 802.15.4 MAC 
sublayer. Later, Tseng et al. [7] identified some security weaknesses in the scheme of Wong et al., 
which prevent it from being implemented in real-life environments. They showed that Wong et al.’s 
scheme is not protected from replay and forgery attacks, passwords can easily be revealed by any of 
the sensor nodes, and users cannot freely change their passwords. To overcome these discrepancies, 
Tseng  et al. proposed an enhanced scheme and claimed that their scheme not only retains the 
advantages of Wong et al.’s scheme, but provides: resistance to replay and forgery attacks, reduction 
of password leakage risk, and capability of changeable password with better efficiency [7]. Lately, T.H. 
Lee [8] also analyzed Wong et al.’s scheme and proposed two simple dynamic user authentication 
protocols that are variations of Wong et al.’s scheme. In his first protocol, T.H. Lee simplified the 
authentication process by reducing the computational load of sensor nodes while preserving the same 
security level of Wong et al.’s scheme. On the other hand, in his second protocol, T.H. Lee proposed a 
scheme in which an intruder cannot impersonate the gateway node to grant access to illegitimate users.  
L.C. Ko [9] proved that while Tseng et al.’s scheme achieves several security measures above 
Wong et al.’s scheme, it is still insecure under a reasonable attack model [9]. L.C. Ko discussed that 
Tseng et al.’s scheme does not achieve mutual authentication between the Gateway node (GW) and the 
Sensor node (SN), and between the User (U) and the SN. Furthermore, L.C. Ko identified that an 
adversary can forge the communication message which is sent from sensor node to the gateway node. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Consequently, L.C. Ko proposed a modified scheme which attempts to overcome the aforementioned 
security pitfalls of Tseng et al.’s protocol and proved that his scheme has better security features than 
Tseng et al.’s scheme. [7]  
Binod et al. [10] cryptanalyzed the authentication schemes of Wong et al. and Tseng et al. and 
proposed their improved scheme. Binod et al. showed that their scheme is more robust than previously 
published schemes and can withstand replay attack, forgery attack, man-in-the-middle attack and 
provides mutual authentication between login node and gateway node.  
Recently, M.L. Das [11] proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme in WSNs. M.L. Das also 
identified that Wong et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to many logged-in users with the same login-id 
threat, that is, who has a valid user’s password can easily login to the sensor network [11]. He also 
identified that Wong et al.’s protocol is susceptible to stolen-verifier attack, because the GW-node and 
login-node maintain the lookup table of all the registered users’ credentials. Consequently, M.L. Das 
proposed his protocol to overcome the security flaws of Wong et al.’s scheme. His protocol uses the 
two factor authentication concept based on password and smart card and resists many logged-in users 
with the same login identity, stolen-verifier, guessing, replay, and impersonation attacks. 
More recently, Nyang and Lee pointed out that the protocol of M.L. Das is vulnerable to offline 
password guessing attack, sensor node compromising attack, and does not protect query response 
messages by establishing a unique secure channel from sensor node to a user, which is an important 
way of serving a registered user in a secure and legitimate way [17]. Consequently, Nyang and Lee 
proposed their improved two-factor authentication protocol for WSNs, which attempts to overcome 
their identified discrepancies in the M.L. Das scheme.  
However, in this paper, we identify that the M.L. Das-scheme is still not secure and vulnerable to 
several critical security attacks. In addition to the problems identified by Nyang and Lee, we show that 
the M.L. Das-scheme is defenseless against GW-node by-passing attack, does not provide mutual 
authentication between GW-node and sensor nodes, has the security threat of insider attack, and does 
not have provision for changing or updating passwords of registered users. To fix the aforementioned 
weaknesses of the M.L. Das-scheme, we propose security improvements in our paper. Our enhanced 
security patch contains secure features of changing or updating passwords of users, provides protection 
against insider attack, overcomes the GW-node bypassing attack, and provides mutual authentication 
between GW-node and sensor node. The proposed security improvements can easily be incorporated 
into the M.L. Das-scheme to take the benefit of more secure and robust two-factor user authentication 
in WSNs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 briefly reviews the M.L. Das-scheme, 
Section 3 elaborates on the weaknesses and security pitfalls of his scheme, Section 4 presents our 
proposed security patch, improvements and analysis over the M.L. Das-scheme, Section 5 reveals the 
performance analysis of the presented scheme, and finally, Section 6 concludes this paper. 
2. Review of the M.L. Das-Scheme 
In this section, we briefly review user the authentication scheme of M.L. Das, which is divided into 
two phases, namely the registration phase and the authentication phase.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
 
 
2453
2.1. Registration Phase 
When a user    wants to perform registration with the WSN, he submits his     and     to the 
Gateway node (GW-node) in a secure manner. Upon receiving the registration request, the GW-node 
computes           ||           , where K is a symmetric key that is secure to the GW-node, and 
‘||’ is a bit-wise concatenation operator. Now, the GW-node personalizes the smart card with the 
parameters   . ,    ,   ,       and   , where   .   is a one-way secure hash function and    is  a 
secret value generated securely by the GW-node and stored in some designated sensor nodes before 
deploying the WSN. At the end of this phase,    gets his personalized smart card in a secure manner. 
2.2. Authentication Phase 
The authentication phase is invoked when    wants to login into WSN or access data from the 
network. This phase is further sub-divided into two phases, namely login and verification phases. 
 
1)  Login Phase 
In the login phase,    inserts his smart card into terminal and inputs     and    . The smart card 
validates the     and     with the stored values. If    is successfully authenticated, the smart 
card performs the following steps: 
Step- L1: Computes                ||           ||  , where   is the current timestamp of    system 
Step- L2: Computes            ||  ||  , then send         ,   ,   to the GW-node 
2)  Verification Phase 
Upon receiving the login request         ,   ,   at time   , the GW-node authenticates    by the 
following steps: 
Step-V1: Checks if          ∆   then GW-node proceeds to the next step, otherwise verification 
step is terminated. Here ∆  shows the expected time interval for the transmission delay 
Step-V2: Computes      ||                       ||   and   
            ||             ||  ||    
Step-V3: if   
       then GW-node accepts the login request; otherwise login 
request is rejected.  
Step-V4: GW-node now sends a message         ,   ,     to some nearest sensor    over a public 
channel to respond the query data what     is looking for, where the value of    is     
      ||  ||  ||   , where    is the current timestamp of the GW-node. Here, the value of    is 
used to ensure    that the message originally comes from the real GW-node.  
Step-V5:  After receiving the message         ,   ,    , the     validates the timestamp. If the 
timestamp is within valid interval, then    computes        |  ||  |     and checks whether it is 
equal to   . If this step is passed, then    responds to the   ’s query. 
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3. Cryptanalysis and Security Pitfalls of the M.L. Das-Scheme 
3.1. GW-Node Bypassing Attack 
In the M.L. Das-scheme, after performing the verification phase and accepting the login request of 
  , the GW-node sends an intimation message       ,   ,     to some nearest sensor node    to inform 
about the successful login of   , and requests    to respond the query/data of   . Here,    is computed 
by                ||  ||  ||   , where    is a secret parameter which is known to GW-node, sensor node and 
stored in the smart card of   .    is the timestamp of GW-Node and      is the dynamic ID of user, 
which is calculated by                ||            ||  . In the M.L. Das-scheme, the value of    is used to 
ensure    that    message is coming from the legitimate GW-node. Here, we assume that if the value of 
   is extracted from smart card of    by some means [12,13], then    himself or any adversary can 
login the    without going through the verification of GW-node, so Das et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to 
‘GW-node by-passing attack’. In the following, we show how this attack works on the M.L   
Das-scheme: 
(i)  Suppose an adversary or     himself computes a fake dynamic identity       by using the 
extracted      from  smart  card                 ||            ||     , where       is a fake ID of 
adversary,      is a randomly chosen fake password, and      is the current timestamp of 
adversary’s machine.  
(ii) Adversary computes                ||  ||  ||    , where    is the nearest sensor node for querying 
the data. 
(iii)  Now, adversary sends the message         ,   ,       to       over insecure communication 
channel.  
(iv)  After receiving the message,    first validates    . If           ∆  , then    proceeds to next 
step, otherwise terminates the operation. Here, ∆  shows the expected time interval for the 
transmission delay. 
(v)    now computes   
              ||  ||  ||     and checks whether the value of   
       
? or not. If it 
holds,    responds to the adversary’s query, and   , who is an adversary and not a legitimate 
user of the sensor network system, enjoys the resources as an authorized user without being a 
member of the system. 
3.2. No Mutual Authentication between GW and Sensor Nodes 
In the M.L. Das-scheme, after accepting the login request of   , the GW-node sends a message 
        ,   ,       to some nearest sensor node    . Here the value of      is computed by 
                |  ||  |     , where     is the current timestamp of GW-node. This message informs the 
sensor node to respond the query/data, which    is requesting from the sensor network. In this message, 
the value of    is used to ensure the sensor node that it is come from the real GW-node. However, 
sensor node verifies the authenticity of GW-node but there is no authenticity that the sensor node is 
fake or real. Thus, the M.L. Das-scheme only provides unilateral authentication between the GW-node 
and sensor node, and there is not mutual authentication between the two nodes, which is an 
indispensable property of authentication protocol designing [14]. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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3.3. Privileged-Insider Attack 
In a real environment, it is a common practice that many users use same passwords to access 
different applications or servers for their convenience of remembering long passwords and ease-of-use 
whenever required. However, if the system manager or a privileged-insider of the GW-node knows the 
passwords of   , he may try to impersonate    by accessing other servers where    could be a registered 
user. In the M.L. Das-scheme,    performs registration with GW-node by presenting his password in 
plain format i.e.,    . Thus, his scheme has pitfalls in terms of insider’s attack of GW-node by a 
privileged user who has come to know the password of    and can misuse the system in future [15]. 
3.4. No Provision for Changing/Updating Passwords 
In the M.L. Das-scheme, there is no provision for    to change or update his password whenever 
required. It is widely recommended security policy for highly secure applications that user’s should 
update or change their passwords frequently, while there is no such option in the M.L. Das-scheme.  
4. Proposed Security Improvements and Analysis 
In this section, we propose security improvements over the scheme of M.L. Das and perform 
analysis of our security patches as follows: 
4.1. Introducing Password Change Phase    
In this subsection, we introduce the password-change/update phase in the M.L. Das-scheme. In the 
password-change phase, when a user wants to change his password     to a new password    
 , he 
inserts his smart card into the terminal and enters his ID and password. Smart card validates his     and 
     with the stored values and if the entered     and      are correct, then the smart performs the 
following operations without interacting with GW-node: 
(i)  Computes   
                 ||             ||   
  , where the value of    is already stored on 
smart card i.e.              ||             
(ii)  Smart card replaces the old value of    with the new values   
  and      
  . Now, the new 
password is successfully changed and this phase is terminated. 
4.2. Protection against Insider Attack 
As we have mentioned in subsection 3.3, the M.L. Das-scheme has vulnerability of privileged-
insider attack due to the reason of presenting his plain text password     to the GW-node. This 
problem can simply be overcome if    only submits        to the GW-node, which is the hashed value 
of plain text password. Thus in the registration phase, the GW-node would compute 
             ||              , instead of just              ||           , and the person except    will never 
know his secret password, which can protect from the possibility of privileged-insider attack [16].  
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4.3. Overcoming GW-node Bypassing Attack and Providing Mutual Authentication  
It was identified in subsection 3.1 that there is the possibility of GW-node bypassing attack in M.L. 
Das-scheme and an adversary without passing the login from the GW-node can access the resources of 
the sensor network. The reason for the possibility of GW-node bypassing attack is due to sharing of 
secret parameter    with the sensor node    and user   . If the value of    is compromised, then the 
whole sensor network will become vulnerable to the GW-node bypassing attack.  
Thus, we propose not to share the same secret parameters with    and   , and that every entity has 
its own secret parameter or key. Here, we suggest that the GW-node should only share    with    and 
there should be another secret parameter    , which should only be known to the GW-node and sensor 
nodes, and can be stored in sensor nodes before their deployment in the field. These sensor nodes are 
responsible to respond users for their queries.  
To overcome this security flaw, the Step-V4 and Step-V5 in the verification phase of the M.L. Das-
scheme can be amended by the following steps: 
(i)  After accepting the login request of   , the GW-node sends message         ,   ,    , to 
some nearest sensor node    to respond the query/data of   , where    is computed by     
      ||  ||  ||   . Here    is the secret parameter, which is securely stored in sensor node    and 
shared only with the GW-node, and    is the current timestamp of GW-node’s system. 
(ii)  Upon receiving the message         ,   ,    , the designated sensor node validates the 
timestamp. If            ∆  , then     proceeds to next step, otherwise terminates the further 
operation. Here, ∆  shows the expected time interval for the transmission delay and      is the 
current timestamp of sensor node   .  
(iii)     now  computes   
              ||  ||  ||     and checks whether   
       
?   or not. If it holds, 
then     responds to   ’s query, otherwise terminates the operation. 
(iv)  To provide mutual authentication between GW-node and sensor node,     now 
computes           ||  ||     . Here       is the current timestamp of sensor node’s system and 
sends back mutual authentication message     ,       to the GW-node. 
(v)  After receiving the mutual authentication message    ,      , the GW-node first checks 
the validity of time-stamp. If                ∆   , then GW node performs the further operations, 
otherwise the mutual authentication phase is terminated. Here, ∆   shows the expected time 
interval for the transmission delay and        is the current timestamp of GW-node. 
(vi)  GW-node now computes   
          ||  ||      and checks whether   
       
?  or not. If it is true, 
then GW-node establishes trust on sensor node, otherwise, GW-node intimates     about the 
possibility of malicious sensor node in the network and sends a process-termination message.  
(vii)  After successful authentication,    enjoys the resources provided by the sensor network. 
 
Although, in the proposed security patch, the introduction of one more secret parameter    creates 
storage overhead on the GW-node, but its benefits are two-fold and cannot be overlooked. The first 
benefit, as defined previously, is to overcome the GW-node bypassing attack, while the second benefit 
is the ease of secret parameter (key) updating incase of compromise of    by an adversary. In the M.L. 
Das- scheme, if    is compromised and GW-node has to revoke    with a new secret parameter   
 , then Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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the cost of revoking   
  is very high because it needs to be updated on all   ’s smart cards as well as all 
the sensor nodes in the field. While on the other hand, in our proposed security improvement/patch, the 
cost of revoking secret parameters either    or    can be halved due to assigning different values    and 
   to    and   , respectively. 
5. Performance Analysis of Proposed Scheme 
In this section, we summarize security features and performance analysis of our proposed scheme 
and compare its security and robustness with the schemes of M.L. Das [11], and Nyang and Lee [17]. 
Table 1 demonstrates that our scheme is more secure and robust than the schemes of [11] and [17], and 
achieves more security features, which were not considered in the aforementioned schemes and are 
essentially required to implement a practical and universal two-factor user authentication protocol in 
WSNs.  
Table 1. Performance analysis and comparison of the proposed scheme. 
Security Features and Performance  Proposed scheme  M.L. Das [11]  Nyang-Lee [17] 
Securely change/update password  Yes  No  No 
Protection against insider’s attack  Yes  No  No 
Protection against Gateway node bypassing attack  Yes  No  No 
Mutual authentication between GW and sensor nodes  Yes  No  Yes 
Computational operations in registration phase  3H  2H  2H 
Computational operations in login phase  3H  3H  3H 
Computational operations in verification phase  7H  5H  12H 
H: The computational cost of one hash operation 
Furthermore, it can be seen from Table 1 that our scheme needs only 13 hashing operations, in 
contrast to the protocols of M.L. Das and Nyang-Lee, which require 10 and 17 hash computations, 
respectively. Our scheme provides protection against insider attack, gateway node bypassing attack, 
password change/update option, and achieves mutual authentication between gateway and sensor 
nodes, which require few more hashing operations than [11] to enhance the security of overall 
authentication system. Hence, the computational overhead of the proposed scheme are not too high, 
but the scheme contains several enhanced security features, which are indispensable for implementing 
a reliable and trustworthy remote user authentication scheme in the WSN environment. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown that a recently proposed two-factor user authentication scheme in 
WSN environment is insecure against different kinds of attack and should not be implemented in real-
applications. We have demonstrated that in the M.L. Das-scheme, there is no provision for users to 
change or update their passwords, the GW-node bypassing attack is possible, it does not provide 
mutual authentication between GW-node and sensor node, and it is susceptible to privileged-insider 
attack. To remedy the aforementioned flaws, we have proposed security patches and improvements, 
which overcome the weak features of the M.L. Das-scheme. The presented security improvements can Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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easily be incorporated in the M.L. Das-scheme for a more secure and robust two-factor user 
authentication in WSNs. 
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